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Latin America - includes Mexico, the Central American and South American Nations
MERCOSUR - Common Market of the Southern Cone (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay,
Uruguay)
MFN - Most-favored-nation treatment
NAFTA - North American Free Trade Agreement
NT - National treatment
NY Convention - UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards
OAS - Organization of American States
Pacific Five SELA - Economic System of Latin America
SIECA - Permanent Secretariat of the General Treaty on Central American Integration
SICA - Central American Integration System
Summit of the Americas - Periodic Meeting (1994-Miami, 1998 - Santiago, 2001 Toronto) of Heads of State and Governments Authority for Western Hemispheric
Nations (excluding Cuba) respecting the FTAA Process
UNCTAD - United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNCITRAL Rules - U.N. Committee on International Trade Law Rules on Arbitration
World Bank - International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
WTO - World Trade Organization

I.

Introduction.

To proffer that U.S. business operates solely on a short and medium-term timeframe,
devoid of long-term strategic planning and interest, would be both unfair and incomplete. Certainly, larger multinational enterprises (with adequate capital, management
expertise, technology bases and integrated information/knowledge centers) engage in
meaningful levels of longer-term strategic business planning (Aggarwal, 1999, at 83). Yet,
for these enterprises the immediate practical context of business operations and transactions still predominates in the business decision-making processes (St. Goar, 1999, at 93).
Even more so, smaller and medium enterprises, the primary intended beneficiaries of the
FTAA process, normally cannot afford such "luxury;" though, they often will seek longerterm perspectives through participation in business associations, chambers of commerce,
and cross-border networks of contacts (Smith, 1999, at 38).
It is within this practical business backdrop that the FTAA, as a discernable and definable end result, is largely irrelevant in any specific and immediate sense to a U.S. firm's
decision-making with respect to doing business in the Americas. If FTAA occurs in 2005,
as currently planned, it will most probably be a practical "non-event" for U.S. business, as
adjustments under the FTAA will have been and will continue to be incremental-preand post-adoption. A similar view could have been postulated respecting the NAFTA in
1994 (Norton and Bloodworth, 1995, Ch. 1).
On the other hand, if the FTAA fails to come about as planned, U.S. business activities
within the Americas most probably will continue "as usual," lest this failure portrays a
fundamental political or economic crises and destabilization within the hemisphere
(Lawrence, 1999, at 6).
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This author suggests that the critical importance of a FTAA for U.S. business is as a
"code word" for an ongoing "environmental process" that is now two decades of age. This
"process" reflects and supports a general ongoing search within our hemisphere for
nations to pursue sustainable economic development through the creation of a favorable,
predictable, transparent, and stable hemispheric "climate" for liberalizing trade and
investment. Correspondingly, this process is concerned with developing and strengthening "free market" infrastructures, more democratic and accountable political institutions,
and a more "rule-based" and "rule of law" civil society (e.g., Bush, 1990; EAI). Thus the
"ongoing process:' perhaps, is more significant than the end result; and the supportive
"climate" created and sustained, perhaps, is more important than the specificity of any
treaty provisions.
The remaining sections of this article will elaborate more fully on these views of the
author. To this end, section II will reflect upon the notion of FTAA as a code word for this
ongoing environmental process from the respective vantage point of the developed and the
developing nations of the hemisphere. Section III will consider the primary expectations of
U.S. enterprises for doing business within the hemisphere and the extent these can be met
without a formal FTAA though within the FTAA process. Section IV will explore how the
FTAA process entails a complex matrix of existing bilateral, regional, and subregional treaty
arrangements within and without the hemisphere. Section V will provide some concluding
observations on the prospects for a specific hemispheric FTAA process.
For purposes of this article, the concept of "doing business" is intended to include
broad notions of trade in goods and services, direct investment, licensing, and franchising, along with collateral notions of cross-border movements of key personnel and capital, effective dispute resolution mechanisms, suitable intellectual property protection,
adequate financing sources and mechanism, and the related legal taxation and accounting
infrastructures (Streng and Salacuse, 1983, as updated, vol. 1). In addition, the "business"
views expressed herein are from the limited perch of a "business lawyer" involved as part
of the business decision-making process, but not of an actual business decision-maker or
government policymaker.

II. "Code Word" for an Ongoing "Environmental Process" for Economic,
Political, and Legal Reform.
As NAFTA could be viewed as a "code word" for an ongoing environmental process
respecting trade and direct investment liberalization, so also can the FTAA. Here two
related, but distinct perspectives are germane: that of the developing countries of the
hemisphere (i.e., 32 of the 34 FTAA nations, excluding Cuba) and that of the two developed countries of the hemisphere (i.e., the United States and Canada).

A.

THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' PERSPECTIVE.

The underlying movement toward trade and direct investment liberalization in the
hemisphere can be substantially attributed to a fundamental shift in the early 1980s in the
domestic economic policies of Mexico, as followed subsequently by other key Latin
American countries such as Argentina and Chile (Abbott and Bowman, 1994). During the
1960s and 1970s Mexico, the other Latin American states, and (for that matter) most
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"Third World" countries espoused an economic development model rooted in "(1) public
ordering and state planning of the economy and society; (2) reliance on state enterprises
as economic actors; (3) restrictions and regulation of private enterprise; and (4) limitation and control of the country's economic relations with the outside world." (Salacuse,
1999, at 877). In addition, most of these Latin American countries were characterized also
by authoritarian regimes under a "one-party" state or military regime. Economic, political
and social life of these countries were largely state-oriented and state-directed (Linz and
Stepan, 1978; and W.C. Smith, 1993).

1. The Mexican Situation.
The two "six year periods" of Presidents Escheverria and Lopez Portillo, beginning in
December 1970, saw the Mexican economy go from a new exuberance that the Mexican
State could funnel significantly new resources to meet the country's significant social needs
while fostering new industrial growth to severe economic crises. Much of the exuberance
was rooted in the country's estimation of its national control of petroleum resources in
light of rocketing oil prices in the 1970s. This newfound national wealth led the government
and its state-controlled enterprises to undertake significant indebtedness in world money
and capital markets. The unforeseen dilemma was that such sovereign-related indebtedness
was tied to "floating rate" debt instruments and that the 1970s and 1980s would witness
unprecedented national and global inflation (Norton et al., 1990, chs. 2 & 3).
Also, during this period, Mexico (as with most Third World countries) held to an economic policy of import-substitution and severe restrictions on foreign direct investment.
This economic policy complemented a national foreign policy based on a perceived
"North-South" struggle between the industrialized nations and the developing nations.
While the Mexican economy grew at a robust pace, external debt quadrupled between
1976 and 1982 (to reach two-thirds of the country's GNP by the end of 1982). This situation, coupled with the dramatic drop in world oil prices, led to the devaluation of the
peso and a government moratorium on sovereign external debt. The ensuing nationalization of the Mexican banking system added further erosion to public confidence, leading
to increased capital flight. (Id.)
The new government of President de la Madrid, taking over in December of 1982,
undertook a fundamental reordering of the Mexican economy. A tough anti-inflationary
policy (i.e., austerity, shock plan), with a price freeze and a fixed exchange rate, was introduced. At the same time, a more favorable environment for foreign direct investment was
being gradually put into place. (Id.)
Further, by mid-1985, Mexico had embarked upon a broad trade program, including
reduction of the use of import licenses, major tariff cuts, and phasing-out of official
import pricing. Even more significant, the government announced it was prepared to
enter into the world trade order by opening membership negotiation with GATT. Within
a year, the GATT accession negotiations were completed.
Moreover, in early 1985, President de la Madrid, trying to stave off the adverse impact
of possible U.S. trade sanctions and (more generally) to better manage and promote
Mexico-U.S. trade relations, began bilateral discussions on a wide range of trade issues
with the United States. This led to a Mexico-U.S. Commercial Framework Agreement on
Trade and Investment signed in November 1987.
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This 1987 Framework Agreement can be seen as a landmark in Mexico-U.S. commercial relations and a direct forerunner of the NAFTA. The agreement touched upon such
subject matter as incipient dispute resolution mechanisms; improved data exchange; an
"Immediate Action Agenda" covering such sensitive matters as textiles, electronic products, agricultural products and steel; foreign investment; and an initial approach to services. This agreement also set into play ongoing, bilateral sectoral consultations and consultation groups on matters (e.g., foreign investment). The focused cooperative efforts
were to prove invaluable as the United States and Mexico moved toward NAFTA (U.S.Mexico Joint Statement, 1998).
As domestic and economic reform progressed in Mexico, so did infrastrucural legal
reform in the business, property, and commercial law areas and so did gradual political
reform toward a greater democratization of Mexican political society (Norton et al., 1990).
This was the new, but fragile environment President Salinas came into. How to help
consolidate and to solidify these reform efforts became a major concern of Salinas. Also
of continuing concern was the fear U.S. trade policy might turn more protectionist to the
detriment of Mexico's economic development.
In a real sense, NAFTA became feasible because of this decade of domestic reform in
Mexico and these related concerns of President Salinas and his government. As such,
Salinas initiated with U.S. President Bush the concept of a Mexico-U.S. FTA, which quickly became translated into the trilateral NAFTA negotiations, including Canada. In doing
so, Salinas and the Mexican government signaled that a new model of economic development was in place; that Mexico and other Latin and Third World nations were desirous of
being equal players in the new world economic order; and that the worn paradigm of
"North-South" conflict was now one of North-South cooperation (Bello and Holmer,
1993, at 593).
2.

The BroaderLatin American Situation.

This fundamental reform process was not limited to the Mexico experience; but the
Mexican situation served as a new model for domestic reform and transition among the
other Latin American nations. Argentina and Chile, and to a lesser degree the mammoth
economy of Brazil, came to forge their own new dynamic and more market-oriented economic reform processes. In addition, new regional and subregional arrangements (e.g.,
LAIA, MERCOSUR, and CACM) emerged, demonstrating a greater substance, direction,
and commitment than the defunct integration efforts of the 1970s (e.g., LAFTA); and a
preexisting, protectionist arrangement, such as the Andean Compact, transformed itself
into a more open and externally positive Community (Hufbauer and Schott).
Moreover, as will be discussed more fully below, the Latin countries in the 1990s and
currently have taken the initiative to enter into numerous bilateral trade and investment
arrangements among their Latin and North American partners, and external to the hemisphere (FTAA Investment Agreement Compendium, OAS, 1999). These external relations
have even included comprehensive arrangements with the European Union (Irela Web
site; and R. Bouzas, 1998).
The reality is that a dynamic and evolving process of economic reform has been "in
play" in Latin America now for nearly two decades. The FTAA, for our Latin neighbors,
became another dimension and catalyst to this ongoing process, even within the current
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vacuum of U.S. leadership as to this process (as exemplified by the U.S. President's inability to bring "fast track authority" to the 1998 Santiago Summit respecting the Chilean
accession to NAFTA and the FTAA more generally) (Otero-Lathrop, 1998).
B.

THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES' PERSPECTIVE.

I. The UnitedStates.
U.S. direct involvement in regional integration is of recent vintage. Post-World War II
U.S. involvement has largely been indirect, for example, in its support of European integration through the EFTA, European Community, and now the European Union or in
condoning a qualified free trade area exception under the GATT/WTO. Concern for Latin
American integration efforts, until this past decade, has been largely indifferent, filtering
primarily through the OAS and the IDB (J.J. Norton, 1986). In particular, Latin American
integration efforts of the 1970s and early 1980s often were viewed as hostile to American
economic interests (T.A. O'Keefe, Transnational, 1997).
U.S. attention to trade and investment issues essentially were bilateral (through FCN or
BIT treaties) or multilateral through the GATT (now WTO) processes. In fact, the U.S.
FTA model arose with the bilateral arrangement with Israel in the mid-1980s (Israel-U.S.
FTA of 1985) and a few years later with the bilateral FTA with Canada (Canada-U.S. FTA
of 1988; and J. Bello and A. Holmer, 1990). As originally proposed, NAFTA itself started
as a bilateral FTA with Mexico; but through Canadian diplomacy, converted itself into the
current trilateral NAFTA.
Perhaps the first clear, comprehensive national statement of a U.S. hemispheric foreign
policy and foreign trade approach (notwithstanding the 1960s euphoric "Alliance for
Progress" of President Kennedy) came with President Bush's "Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative" speech of June 27, 1990 (subsequent to President Salinas' initial initiatives for a
U.S.-Mexico FTA). In his remarks, President Bush reflected upon the general movement
of the Latin American and Caribbean nations toward more democratic political institutions and a more civil society and away from statist economic policies. This belated U.S.
recognition of a new political and economic environment emerging within the LAC led
the U.S. President to propose a "genuine partnership" throughout the hemisphere for free
market reform based on "trade and not aid." (Bush, 1990).
The three "pillars" of the EAI were to be trade, investment, and debt restructuring. No
grand umbrella arrangement was proposed, as there is "no blueprint, no one-size-fits-all
approach to [such] reform," with "the primary responsibility for achieving economic
growth [resting] with each individual country." President Bush welcomed and encouraged the various individual, bilateral, subregional, and regional efforts that were underway in the LAC. (Id.)
It was only with the NAFTA safely "put to bed" in late 1993 that U.S. policymakers
came to theorize on how hemispheric FTAs could be used as a program of "continuous
progressive expansion" that would lock-in the hemispheric economic and political reform
processes. The goal of hemispheric free trade was viewed as "long-term." Ongoing bilateral usage of bilateral FTAs "with appropriate countries in Latin America and the
Caribbean, and possibly some Asian countries" was viewed as the way forward. Moving
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from "fair trade" to "free trade" was to be a progressive process through sectional ("building block") agreements. (See, e.g., USTR-Post NAFTA Policy 1994).
NAFTA accession would be carefully explored on a case-by-case basis, but bilateral
FTAs were the preferred expansion instruments. Though the concept has been since
abandoned, it was thought that the building of a hemispheric free trade zone over the
long-term could be achieved "through a 'hub-and spoke' of bilateral FTAs between us and
other countries by NAFTA accession, or by some combination." In fact, a separate FTA
might be a predecessor to an eventual NAFTA accession (USTR, 1994).
Thus, in a manner similar to President Salinas' desire to solidify a decade of fundamental reform in Mexico through the NAFTA, the United States was desirous of solidifying
and further fostering hemispheric economic and political reforms, while maintaining for
the United States "maximum flexibility to enter agreements that are in our (i.e., U.S.) best
interest." (Id.) As will be discussed below, the post-NAFTA, U.S. embrace of a more coherent and comprehensive FTAA hemispheric approach, though not inconsistent with the
EAI, does mark a fundamental advancement of U.S. foreign and trade policy toward the
LAC area.
2. Canada.
Though Canada's trade and other economic relations with Mexico and Latin America
were not entirely non-existent historically, Canada's economic relations were deeply
entwined to a very significant degree with the United States and to a lesser degree with
Western Europe and the Commonwealth nations. The initial incentive for Canada to seek
NAFTA membership was a fear that a strong U.S.-Mexico bilateral FTA might come to
undermine or diminish Canada's position under the CUFTA. However, in many ways,
Canada has proven to be a most constructive force in fostering the NAFTA and broader
Western Hemispheric integration efforts and has reaped far greater economic and political benefits from NAFTA than had been originally anticipated (Swanson, April 2000).

III. Doing Business Without a FTAA, But Within the FTAA Process.
The current push toward a FTAA has not been a driving consideration of American
business (Cf, Portras 2000). The Canadian/U.S. Free Trade Arrangement made recognizable business sense (See, inter alia, Abbott and Bowman). NAFTA, though perceived as
having net benefits for U.S. businesses (at least in the southwest United States), must be
seen as largely a "political event." To date, one can readily find numerous conflicting studies and analyses of experts arguing over the overall economic gains of NAFTA (Cf,
Weintraub, 2000). This quandary is not unique. In fact, even after fifty years of economic
integration in Western Europe, the true raison d'etre for this ongoing integration process
remains essentially political (See, inter alia, Davey, 1993).
Certainly, putting aside whether one country's economy or a business sector gains or
loses economically, it cannot be denied that a North America with NAFTA presents a more
favorable environment for cross-border trade and investment and new cross-border, economic and business opportunities among the three contracting parties, than a North
America without NAFTA (Garten, 1995). Equally so, a FTAA also can be viewed as being
more favorable for ihose businesses of the thirty-four involved nations seeking cross-border
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trade and investment opportunities within the hemisphere than a hemisphere without the
FTAA. General reduction of trade and investment barriers, promotion of a top-class intellectual property regime, creation of a viable dispute resolution mechanism for the contracting parties (and in some instances for private parties) - these all can only be estimated as
"business facilitators." (See, e.g., Trakman, 1997).
However, NAFTA and a FTAA not so much forge "new territory" but solidify and support what are generally viewed as the fundamental preconditions for effective, long-term
trade and direct investment liberalization in an overall favorable trade and investment
environment. Such "preconditions" might include for a particular country:
* sound and consistent macroeconomic policies;
* a stable and accountable political system;
* fair, transparent, and efficient administrative system;
* a viable legal and judicial infrastructure receptive to business and commercial
activities (including modern property, contract, commercial, secured transactions, corporate and insolvency laws);
* effective and enforceable judicial and non-judicial dispute resolution mechanisms;
* sound corporate governance and accounting systems;
• developing, but stable and transparent financial markets/systems;
a suitable public transportation, and technological infrastructure;
* a sufficient, stable, and trained workforce;
* reasonable and predictable tax regime (preferably with a favorable double taxation treaty(ies));
minimum and contained corruption, criminality and terrorism;
* currency convertibility and free capital exchange movements;
geographic proximity or centrality for trade/business expansion; and
* a true atmosphere of trust and confidence in engaging in local "partnership" or
other business contractual arrangements. (Norton, 1999, Secs. III and IV).
When looked at in this context, all of the above factors are not directly dealt with by
the FTAA or a FTA.
The reality is that while the actual reduction/elimination of barriers to cross-border
trade and investments are centrally important for businesses, these other key, infrastructural elements rest largely within the domain of domestic reform initiatives or of "extraTAA" intergovernmental cooperative efforts. For instance, sound and consistent macroeconomic policies and political stability clearly facilitate exchange rate stability, which is
itself undoubtedly a precondition for effective international trade within any country or
region. This is a matter for the government policy and decision-makers.
Additionally, for another example, transparency and accountability in commercial law
regimes, particularly regarding corporate and insolvency laws, financial regulation and
dispute resolution mechanisms, are essential in attracting foreign trade and direct investment. Many countries in this region have made cognizable legal and regulatory reforms
in these and other critical areas of domestic law reform (e.g., in financial
regulation/supervision area, see E. Aguirre and J. Norton, 2000).
As a general position the FTAA process should continue to facilitate implementation of
these preconditions in the various LAC countries as part of an ongoing economic law
reform process into the first part of this twenty-first century (Barshefsky, 1999).
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EXTERNAL FACTORS ON REFORM.

The movement toward market-oriented economic policies by Mexico and other LAC
countries came largely from the self-realization of these nations that the old economic
development model simply did not work and had become largely counterproductive. This
was reinforced in many instances through IMF, World Bank and IDB structural adjustment
and assistance packages. The IMF and World Bank structural adjustment packages have traditionally focused on macroeconomic criteria, but increasingly have come to incorporate
both structural economic and infrastuctural legal reforms, a trend that became quite evident in packages resulting from the recent 1994-95 Mexican peso crises and the more recent
1997-98 Asian financial crisis. The incorporation of law reform requirements as meaningful
aspects of structural adjustment packages and particularly the continuous monitoring of
implementation of such law reforms by the international financial institutions as prerequisites to receipt of ongoing multilateral financial assistance in trenches over time, have
become modern realities of economic markets (Norton, 1999).
Thus, modernization and upgrading of domestic economic and financial systems have
come about through responsible domestic government and intergovernmental reactions
to crises and otherwise through cooperative efforts within the hemisphere. Illustrative is
the movement toward international approaches to financial supervisory standards. The
development of international financial supervisory standards has manifested through
global public-private forums such as the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and
the International Organization of Securities Commissions. These multilateral forums
have, in recent times, consistently developed supervisory standards for implementation in
home country statutory and regulatory frameworks based on input from both regulatory
agencies and financial market participants. In particular, the Basle Committee and
IOSCO have developed frameworks of "core" principles or standards in recent years for
banking and securities markets that should be incorporated into any financial market
infrastructure. The global economic order now necessitates that member countries and
regional organizations adopt, implement and enforce these principles and standards, as
they will undoubtedly continue to be used by IFIs as a meaningful part of continued
adjustment packages and ultimately by corporates as a "stability factor" in evaluating
potential international banking, finance, and trade opportunities. The LAC countries
themselves have and are taking significant initiatives in these areas (e.g., Association of
Latin American and Caribbean Bank Supervisors).
A meaningful but often overlooked aspect of implementing global financial, trade, and
legal infrastructure is the necessity of addressing corruption, criminality and terrorism.
The FTAA nations have begun to address these issues through distinct domestic, bilateral
regional, international cooperative efforts, many of which also address money laundering
in attempts to comply with the globally derived OECD Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) Recommendations and Basle Committee "Core Principles." Joint, cooperative
efforts are also being undertaken as to anti-terrorism measures (Zagaris and Olive, 1999).
All of these efforts will need to continue indefinitely as these perils will continue to erode
legal infrastructures, political stability, regulatory regimes and economic and financial
market policies (see Norton, "New Financial Architecture" 1999).
Tax policy is another example that is essentially domestic driven, though also subject
to IFI adjustment program commitments. An incidence of significance where domestic

430

NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas

policy becomes transferred through the integration process was evident with the 1993
U.S.-Mexico Double Taxation Treaty. While the public focus was on the NAFTA negotiations, the United States and Mexico successfully completed the most advanced bilateral income treaty. Such a treaty was seen as a concomitant to providing greater certainty
in cross-border business activities and in further converging national tax laws and practices (Dell and Polma, 1995).
B.

ONGOING DOMESTIC REFORM.

The reform of commercial and property laws, and the quality of judicial administration all remain subject to domestic initiatives and reforms. A case in point can be seen in
the secured lending area. Cross-border business depends, to a large extent, upon crossborder financing. Such financing often may be tied to the taking of security. This, in turn,
is linked to the degree of "legal security" and legal certainty a cross-border lender can
obtain within a particular jurisdiction. Given the divides of approaches between
"Common Law" jurisdictions (e.g., the United States and to a large extent Canada) and
"Civil Law" jurisdictions (e.g., Mexico), building legal and practical bridges among the
laws of the differing jurisdictions becomes important. This may entail a number of
domestic options, including innovative and proactive reviews of one's current laws, the
adoption of new laws under one's particular legal tradition, or the wholesale or partial
adoption of foreign or international models (Banowsky and Guabardi, 1995).
C. THE TRANSPARENCY FACTOR.
For a business to evaluate properly cross-border business opportunities, the quality,
predictability, security and transparency of the local economic, political, legal and social
environments are largely determinative; these factors remain essentially domestic in character. For instance, transparency is critical so all the various "players" understand and can
evaluate the rules of the game and so the game can continue successfully and fairly. As
such, legal, accounting, financial, economic and administrative transparency is of the
utmost importance in the long-term development of a country's financial system, and
trade and investment regimes. Transparency is necessary not only for international
investors and businesspeople, but for their domestic counterparts, the corresponding economic and financial markets, and the involved governmental and intergovernmental policy-makers (Norton, Int'l Cooperative Efforts, 1998, at 305-308).
Thus, a FTA network or a FTAA has a practical effect of consolidating and fostering the
desired domestic business/commercial orientation and environments of the involved
countries.

IV. FTAA as a Matrix of Treaty Arrangements v. Singular Goal.
What exists within our hemisphere is a complex and enlarging matrix of diverse trade
and economic treaty arrangements, notwithstanding the move toward a FTAA. In fact,
the FTAA is not intended to preempt or to supersede these arrangements, but to supplement and to "overarch" these (4, Garcia, 1995 and 1997).
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A. THE BILATERAL TRADE TREATY.
Such treaty configurations include over fifty bilateral trade and/or investment treaties
among the intended FTAA members, most of which came on stream only during this past
decade. As to some fifty-eight hemispheric bilateral investment treaties (BITs) reviewed
by the OAS Trade Unit for the FTAA Negotiating Group on Investment, fifty-five were
concluded after 1990. The broad domestic economic reform undertaken by many LAC
nations from the mid-1980s to present has as its logical corollary the need to adopt new
investment regimes. This could be accomplished by domestic law and administrative
reform and through BITs. With a shift from the Latin aversion to arbitration under the
"Calvo doctrine' these BITs incorporated new cross-border, private dispute mechanisms.
These bilateral treaties further advanced the pervasive use of the "national treatment standard" and helped reduce or eliminate restrictions in cross-border capital flows and profits
repatriation. Thus, the increasing prevalence of BITs has served as a leveler and "liberalizer" of the cross-border business "playing field" within the hemisphere (OAS
Compendium, 1999).
B.

THE INTEGRATION ARRANGEMENTS.

Then there are the integration arrangements including customs union/common market configuration of MERCOSUR, the Group of Three (Mexico, Columbia, and
Venezuela), the Central American Common Market (CACM), the Caribbean Community
and Common Market (CARICOM), and the restructured and revitalized Andean
Community. The most "integration intensive" of these arrangements is MERCOSUR.
MERCOSUR goes beyond the level of free trade among the members to embrace a customs union (i.e., with a common external tariff), a common internal market to cover not
only goods but services, establishment labor and capital, and an incipient institutional
governments structure (O'Keefe, 1994; and Haines-Ferrari, 1993).
Equally significant, MERCOSUR has actively pursued accession arrangements with
Chile and Bolivia, and is endeavoring to consult and work closely with other Latin
American groupings (e.g., with the Andean Community). In fact, we see other crossgrouping linkages coming on stream (e.g., G-3 with CARICOM and possibly with
CACM).
All this is occurring notwithstanding active, direct, and ongoing FTAA negotiations
among the thirty-four countries. As such, the hemispheric "playing field" is in a state of
constant flux. Further, the various hemispheric groupings are beginning to adopt common positions on FTAA-related matters-a fact that could well change the dynamics of
the FTAA negotiations process (cf Guira, 1997).
C. THE HEMISPHERIC FTAs.
Add to the above, a half-dozen or so FTAs among the FTAA members-to-be. For example,
FTAs have been concluded between Mexico and Bolivia, Mexico and Costa Rica, Mexico and
Nicaragua, and Mexico and Chile. In fact, Canada has entered into a FTA with Chile, even
though Chilean accession to NAFTA has been forestalled. Chile itself has been active in spinning a web of trade and investment arrangements throughout the hemisphere: as mentioned
above, FTAs with Canada and Mexico, associate status and now full status with MERCOSUR,
and separate bilaterals with Columbia, Ecuador, and Venezuela.
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D.
The Externals.
What makes this matrix even more intriguing and interesting are the EU arrangements
with Mexico and MERCOSUR, and other external negotiations such as with the "Pacific
Five." The EU configuration fills part of a void by U.S. diminishment of leadership in the
current hemispheric trade negotiation processes. The significance of the new external factor to the overall FTAA dynamics remains to be seen (www.eurosur.org/eurosur).
As to a Pacific Five grouping involving the United States, this most likely could be
negotiated without "fast track" authority as the involved Asian Nations are developed
non-low-cost labor economies (i.e., Australia, New Zealand and Singapore; Chile and the
United States are the two Western Hemispheric Members).
E.

ATTEMPTED EVALUATION OF THE MATRIX.

Certainly this matrix evidences an ongoing and proactive desire among our hemispheric
partners for freer trade and investment and, even in some instances, for genuine levels of
economic integration. But where do U.S. businesses fit into the maze? Can conflicting or
differing rules of origin be reconciled so as not to disadvantage U.S. interests? Will new sub-.
regional trade blocs such as MERCOSUR prove to be overly or laterally protectionist vis-Avis the United States? Will the New Latin and Caribbean flirtations with the EU cut against
U.S. interests? These are very real but incredibly difficulty issues to decipher.
On a positive note, the matrix does appear to lend itself to enhanced transparency for
doing business within and throughout the hemisphere: this can only benefit U.S. crossborder business activities. In fact, transparency may be the most significant consequence
and characteristic. U.S. businesses and business lawyers have traditionally shown themselves to be quite innovative when faced with complexities. So long as they have sufficient
"hard" information upon which to evaluate the systemic complexities, then this [somewhat cynically] could even lead (on a short-term, medium-term basis) to competitive
advantages through "jurisdictional and legal arbitrage."
Also, the matrix favors an increase in cross-border joint ventures; generally greater
enforcement of liberal trade and investment policies; the creation of new dispute resolution mechanisms; and the improvement of domestic commercial and business law infrastructures. Where there exists complexities, but with shared policy objectives (i.e., an
embrace of trade and investment liberalization), the tendency of business could be to go
forward with local partners. The local partners can assist in managing better these complexities and can be more reliable co-venturers as the broad governmental objectives will
(in most, but not all instances) be more closely aligned than divergent. Moreover, such an
environment may encourage the further development of an alternative, cross-border,
commercial dispute resolution mechanism, as well as greater practical intergovernmental
and inter-bureaucratic cooperation and collaboration. (Lindsay and Blackaby).
One of the real challenges of the FTAA process is to bring into the sunlight this matrix
of numerous and diverse treaty arrangements for analyses and better coordination and
compatibility, thereby benefiting all members of the impending FTAA (Garcia, 1997).
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V. Concluding Observations: Prospects for the FTAA.
Virtually all of this presentation either has avoided or skirted around any direct discussion of the seriousness and potential value for U.S. businesses of a FTAA. This should not
be taken, however, as an indication that the FTAA will not be a major milestone in the
history of hemispheric cooperation nor be a presenter of new and significant business
opportunities for interested U.S. businesses. The drawback for businesspeople is that it is
currently hard to discern coherence and definitiveness to the process.
A.

THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS AND STRUCTURE.

When one tracks through the Joint Declaration of the Leaders of State and
Governments at the First Summit of the Americas (Miami, 1994), the Second Summit of
the Americas (Santiago, 1998), and the series of five Trade Ministerial Declarations to
date (Denver in 1995, Cartagena in 1996, Belo Horizonte in 1997, San Jose in 1998, and
Toronto in 1999), one begins to glean a very comprehensive planning and negotiating
process-a process that could well overshadow in significance any end result. With an
overall "Plan of Action" being periodically assessed and refined; with the original thirteen
Working Groups streamlined down to nine Negotiating Groups; and with technical assistance and support from the OAS, the IDB and ECLAC, we confront what must be one of
the most sophisticated multilateral trade negotiating processes in history.
Ms. Stephenson, very ably and insightfully, takes us through this FTAA negotiation
process, so I will not belabor the details. But let me highlight what I think are several significant points respecting this process, from a business perspective:
1. The process is largely transparent, with an extensive Web site and extensive, publicly disseminated reports making readily accessible the breadth, depth and current status of the negotiations underway.
2. Each Negotiating Group has a set agenda, reviewed, refined and revised at each
Trade Ministerial Meeting.
3. Each Group is an active "working party" as to a large range of significant issues
being put on the table for review, discussion and consideration by the thirty-four
participating countries.
4. This in-depth, broad and ongoing level of hemispheric cooperation is unprecedented. Even if many issues are not resolved and even if the FTAA target dates of
2003 (for completion of substantive negotiations) and 2005 (for formal enactment) are delayed or abandoned, such serious and open discussions over a prolonged period of time can only prove beneficial for a hemispheric environment
conducive to free trade, investment and hemispheric business opportunities
(Stephenson, 2000).
B. A FTAA BY 2005?
Crystal ball gazing is generally not the "bread and butter" of sound business decisionmaking or of sound business law judgments. So, I will leave such prognostication to the
politicians and policymakers. I suggest this election year the FTAA will not appear on
either candidates "radar screen" for international trade issues: WTO, "globalization" and
maybe even China (notwithstanding recent granting of permanent normal trade status by
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the U.S.), will probably occupy this turf. In actuality, both of the main presidential candidates are, on record, as being supportive of both NAFTA and the FTAA. Despite increasingly strong pressure from the Right and Left for a new protectionism, neither candidate
will probably be drawn into the debate; but, each will probably let the planned FTAA
intergovernmental processes continue on course. A president-elect then will have a period
of several years to leave his mark on the process and to reevaluate and "even" redefine it.
This, however, will not ensure eventual passage. I agree with Mr. Sidney Weintraub that
for the United States to obtain passage of the FTAA, the president will have to be given
"fast-track authority" by the Congress (Weintraub, 2000). Though some speculate that
President Clinton's failure to secure "fast-track" for Santiago had more to do with the person than the subject matter, I suspect that any president is going to find it an "up-road"
struggle against an increasingly recalcitrant and parochial Congress (see, inter alia, James
and Lusztig, 2000 on "fast track.").
Some speculate that the recent Seattle WTO debacle holds new opportunities for the
FTAA process, as it is now "the only game in town." The reality, however, may be that
there is, at least at the moment, no trade game in town (Bergsten, 1999).
The same forces that forced comprehensive side agreements to the NAFTA before it
was passed are still there in the wings. The expanded m~nage that disabled Seattle is
growing with the disenchanted and disenfranchised from the relentless and disorientating
globalization processes. Add to this the emotionalism on drugs and immigration issues
that will irrationally join the onslaught against FTAA. Not too pleasant a picture! And this
is a picture snapped during a period of unprecedented, prolonged economic prosperity in
the United States-when the "feel good factor" should be at its highest. What type of
photo will emerge if the United States has an economic downturn at any time prior to
2005? Also, it needs to be kept in mind that a FTAA with thirty-four divergent countries is
a much more difficult proposition in and of itself than was the NAFTA negotiation.
C. A FTAA AND U.S. BUSINESS: A SUMMATION.
Where does all this lead us-complexity, fragmentation, uncertainty, reactionism?
From a business perspective, it leads us to a situation that, in fact, may hold out significant long-term opportunities and benefits for U.S. business and the U.S. economy. Even
more importantly, a successful FTAA holds out a hemisphere of greater peace, prosperity,
security, harmony and social justice for current and future generations of "Americans."
However, on a current basis, the scenario is most difficult to evaluate (politically, economically and financially). But what can be evaluated as it continues to unfold is the
overall process itself and its direct and indirect consequences. This will assume a continued general sharing of common intergovernmental objectives; good faith collaboration
and consultations respecting the various FTAA Working Groups, Ministerials, and
Summits; and ongoing and enhanced transparency in the process. With these givens,
good businesspeople and business lawyers should be able to figure out the "course" and
(at a minimum) to "stay the course."
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Appendix A - List of Economic and Trade Integration Arrangement in
Western Hemisphere, with country membership
A-1. Trade and Integration Agreements

Andean Community

CARICOM

Group of Three

Bolivia
Columbia
Ecuador
Peru
Venezuela

Antigua and Barbuda
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Dominica
Grenada
Guyana
Haiti
Jamaica
Montserrat
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago

Colombia
Mexico
Venezuela

MERCOSUR

NAFTA

Argentina
Brazil
Paraguay
Uruguay

Canada
Mexico
United States of America

A-2. Bilateral Free Trade Agreements
Bolivia - Mexico
Canada - Chile

Central America - Dominican Republic
Chile - Mexico
Costa Rica - Mexico
Mexico - Nicaragua
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Appendix B -List of Trade and Investment Treaties intra-Western
Hemisphere
B. Bilateral Investment Treaties
ARGENTINA
Bolivia

Convenio entre la Reptiblica de Bolivia y la Repdiblica Argentina para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciprocas de Inversiones, 17 de marzo de 1994.

Canada

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
Republic of Argentina for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 5
November 1991.

Chile

Tratado entre la Reptiblica de Argentina y la Reptiblica de Chile sobre
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, 2 de agosto de 1991.

Costa Rica

Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de Costa Rica y el Gobierno de la Reptiblica de
Argentina para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciprocas de Inversiones, 21 de
mayo de 1997.

Ecuador

Convenio entre el Gobierno de la Repiblica del Ecuador y el Gobierno de la
Reptiblica Argentina para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de
Inversiones, 18 de febrero de 1994.

El Salvador Acuerdo entre la Reptiblica de El Salvador y la Repiblica de Argentina para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, 9 de mayo de 1996.
Guatemala

Acuerdo entre la Reptiblica de Argentina y la Reptiblica de Guatemala para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, 21 de abril de 1998.

Jamaica

Agreement between the Government of Jamaica and the Government of the
Argentine Republic on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, 8 February 1994.

Mexico

Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y el Gobierno
de la Repiblica de Argentina para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de
Inversiones, 13 de noviembre de 1996.

Nicaragua

Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la Rep6blica de Nicaragua y el Gobierno de la
Reptiblica de Argentina para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciprocas de
Inversiones, 10 de agosto de 1998.

Panama

Convenio entre la Reptiblica de Argentina y la Reptiblica de Panam. para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de las Inversiones, 10 de mayo de 1996.
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Convenio entre el Gobierno de la Reptiblica de Argentina y el Gobierno de la
Repiblica del Per sobre Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, 10
de noviembre de 1994.

United States Agreement between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic
concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, 14
November 1991.
Venezuela

Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la Repidblica de Venezuela y el Gobierno de la
Repdblica de Argentina para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciprocas de
Inversiones, 16 de noviembre de 1993.

BARBADOS
Canada

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of
Barbados for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, 29 May
1996.

Venezuela

Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la Reptiblica de Venezuela y el Gobierno de
Barbados para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n de Inversiones, 15 de julio de 1994.

BOLIVIA
Argentina

Convenio entre la Reptdblica de Bolivia y la Reptiblica Argentina para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciprocas de Inversiones, 17 de marzo de 1994.

Chile

Acuerdo entre la Reptiblica de Bolivia y la Reptiblica de Chile para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, 22 de septiembre de 1994.

Ecuador

Convenio entre la Reptiblica de Bolivia y la Reptiblica de Ecuador para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, 25 de mayo de 1995.

Peru

Convenio entre el Gobierno de la Reptiblica del Perti y el Gobierno de la
Reptiblica de Bolivia sobre Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones,
30 de julio de 1993.

United States Treaty between the United States of America and the Government of the
Republic of Bolivia concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection
of Investment, 17 April 1998.
BRAZIL
Chile

Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la Reptiblica de Chile y el Gobierno de la
Reptiblica Federativa de Brasil para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de
Inversiones, 22 de marzo de 1994.
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Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la Repfiblica de Venezuela y el Gobierno de la
Repiiblica Federativa de Brasil para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de las
Inversiones, 4 de julio de 1995.

CANADA
Argentina

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
Republic of Argentina for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 5
November 1991.

Barbados

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of
Barbados for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, 29 May
1996.

Costa Rica

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
Republic of Costa Rica for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 18
March 1998.

Ecuador

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
Republic of Ecuador for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, 29 April 1996.

Panama

Treaty between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
Republic of Panama for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 12
September 1996.

Trinidad

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of
Tobago the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago for the Reciprocal Promotion and
Protection of Investments, 11 September 1995.

Uruguay

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
Eastern Republic of Uruguay for the Promotion and Protection of Investments,
29 October 1997.

Venezuela

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
Republic of Venezuela for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 1 July
1996.

CHILE
Argentina

Tratado entre la Rep6blica de Argentina y la Republica de Chile sobre
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, 2 de agosto de 1991.

Bolivia

Acuerdo entre la Reptiblica de Bolivia y la Repfiblica de Chile para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, 22 de septiembre de 1994.
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Brazil

Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la Reptiblica de Chile y el Gobierno de la
Reptiblica Federativa de Brasil para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de
Inversiones, 22 de marzo de 1994.

Costa Rica

Acuerdo entre la Reptiblica de Chile y la Reptiblica de Costa Rica para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de las Inversiones, 11 de julio de 1996.

Ecuador

Convenio entre el Gobierno de la Reptblica de Chile y el Gobierno de la
Reptblica del Ecuador para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciprocas de
Inversiones, 27 de octubre de 1993.

El Salvador

Acuerdo entre la Reptiblica de El Salvador y la Reptiblica de Chile para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de las Inversiones, 8 de noviembre de 1996.

Guatemala

Acuerdo entre la Reptblica de Guatemala y la Reptiblica de Chile para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de las Inversiones, 8 de noviembre de 1996.

Honduras

Acuerdo entre la Repiblica de Honduras y la Repfiblica de Chile para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de las Inversiones, 11 de noviembre de 1996.

Nicaragua

Acuerdo entre la Reptiblica de Chile y la Reptiblica de Nicaragua para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de las Inversiones, 8 de noviembre de 1996.

Panama

Convenio entre la Reptiblica de Panamiy la Reptiblica de Chile para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de las Inversiones, 8 de noviembre de 1996.

Paraguay

Acuerdo entre la Reptiblica de Chile y la Repiiblica del Paraguay para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de las Inversiones, 7 de agosto de 1995.

Uruguay

Acuerdo entre la Reptiblica de Chile y la Reptiblica Oriental del Uruguay para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de las Inversiones, 26 de octubre de 1995.

Venezuela

Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la Reptiblica de Venezuela y el Gobierno de la
Reptiblica de Chile sobre Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, 2
de abril de 1993.

COLOMBIA
Peru

Convenio entre la Rept~blica de Colombia y el Gobierno de la Reptiblica del
Pert sobre Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, 26 de abril de
1994.
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COSTA RICA
Argentina

Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de Costa Rica y el Gobierno de la Repfiblica de
Argentina para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciprocas de Inversiones, 21 de
mayo de 1997.

Canada

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
Republic of Costa Rica for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 18
March 1998.

Chile

Acuerdo entre la Reptiblica de Chile y la Repdblica de Costa Rica para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de las Inversiones, 11 de julio de 1996.

Paraguay

Acuerdo entre la Reptiblica de Costa Rica y el Gobierno de la Reptdblica del
Paraguay para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, 29 de enero
de 1998.

Venezuela

Acuerdo entre la Repdblica de Venezuela y la Repdblica de Costa Rica para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, 17 de marzo de 1997.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Ecuador

Acuerdo para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n de Inversiones entre el Gobierno de la
Reptiblica del Ecuador y el Gobierno de la Reptiblica Dominicana, 26 de junio
de 1998.

ECUADOR
Argentina

Convenio entre el Gobierno de la Rep6blica del Ecuador y el Gobierno de la
Reptiblica Argentina para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones,
18 de febrero de 1994.

Bolivia

Convenio entre la Reptblica de Bolivia y la Reptblica de Ecuador para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, 25 de mayo de 1995.

Canada

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
Republic of Ecuador for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, 29 April 1996.

Chile

Convenio entre el Gobierno de la Repiblica de Chile y el Gobierno de la
Reptiblica del Ecuador para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciprocas de
Inversiones, 27 de octubre de 1993.
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El Salvador

Convenio entre el Gobierno de la Reptiblica del Ecuador y el Gobierno de la
Reptiblica de El Salvador para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciprocas de
Inversiones, 16 de mayo de 1994.

Paraguay

Convenio entre la ReptCiblica del Paraguay y la Repiblica del Ecuador sobre
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, 28 de enero de 1994.

Dominican Republic
Acuerdo para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n de Inversiones entre el Gobiemo de la
Repfiblica del Ecuador y el Gobierno de la Repiiblica Dominicana, 26 de junio
de 1998.
United States Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, 27
August 1993.
Venezuela

Convenio entre el Gobierno de la Repiiblica de Venezuela y el Gobierno de la
Repdiblica del Ecuador para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciprocas de
Inversiones, 18 de noviembr de 1993.

EL SALVADOR
Argentina

Acuerdo entre la Reptiblica de El Salvador y la Repiiblica de Argentina para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, 9 de mayo de 1996.

Chile

Acuerdo entre la Reptiblica de El Salvador y la Repiblica de Chile para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de las Inversiones, 8 de noviembre de 1996.

Ecuador

Convenio entre el Gobierno de la Repdiblica del Ecuador y el Gobierno de la
Repdiblica de El Salvador para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciprocas de
Inversiones, 16 de mayo de 1994.

Peru

Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la Repfiblica de El Salvador y el Gobierno de la
Repdiblica de Perdi para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, 13
de junio de 1996.

GRENADA
United States Treaty between the United States of America and Grenada Concerning the
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, 2 May 1986.
GUATEMALA
Argentina

Acuerdo entre la Republica de Argentina y la Reptiblica de Guatemala para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, 21 de abril de 1998.
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Chile

Acuerdo entre la Repdiblica de Guatemala y la Rep6blica de Chile para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de las Inversiones, 8 de noviembre de 1996.

HAITI
United States Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Haiti
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, 13
December 1983.
HONDURAS
Chile

Acuerdo entre la Repfiblica de Honduras y la Reptdblica de Chile para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de las Inversiones, 11 de noviembre de 1996.

United States Treaty between the United States of America and the Government of the
Republic of Honduras Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment, I July 1995.
JAMAICA
Argentina

Agreement between the Government of Jamaica and the Government of the
Argentine Republic on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, 8 February 1994.

United States Treaty between the United States of America and Jamaica Concerning the
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, 4 February 1994.
MEXICO
Argentina

Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y el Gobierno de la
Reptiblica de Argentina para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de
Inversiones, 13 de noviembre de 1996.

NICARAGUA
Argentina

Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la Repiblica de Nicaragua y el Gobierno de la
Reptiblica de Argentina para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciprocas de
Inversiones, 10 de agosto de 1998.

Chile

Acuerdo entre la Reptiblica de Chile y la Reptiblica de Nicaragua para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de las Inversiones, 8 de noviembre de 1996.
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United States Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Nicaragua Concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, 1 July 1995.
PANAMA
Argentina

Convenio entre la Reptiblica de Argentina y la Reptiblica de Panamd para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de las Inversiones, 10 de mayo de 1996.

Canada

Treaty between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
Republic of Panama for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 12
September 1996.

Chile

Convenio entre la Reptiblica de Panamdy la Reptiblica de Chile para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de las Inversiones, 8 de noviembre de 1996.

United States Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic Panama
Concerning the Treatment and Protection of Investment, 27 October 1982.
Uruguay

Convenio entre la Reptiblica de Panam. y la Reptiblica Oriental del Uruguay
para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, 15 de septiembre de
1998.

PARAGUAY
Chile

Acuerdo entre la Repdblica de Chile y la Reptiblica del Paraguay para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de las Inversiones, 7 de agosto de 1995.

Costa Rica

Acuerdo entre la Reptiblica de Costa Rica y el Gobierno de la Reptiblica del
Paraguay para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, 29 de enero
de 1998.

Ecuador

Convenio entre la Reptiblica del Paraguay y la Reptdblica del Ecuador sobre
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, 28 de enero de 1994.

Peru

Convenio entre la Repiiblica del Pert y la Repfiblica del Paraguay sobre
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, 31 de enero de 1994.

Venezuela

Convenio sobre Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones entre el
Gobierno de la Reptiblica de Venezuela y el Gobierno de la Reptiblica del
Paraguay, 5 septiembre de 1996.
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PERU
Argentina

Convenio entre el Gobierno de la Reptiblica de Argentina y el Gobierno de la
Repiblica del Perd sobre Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, 10
de noviembre de 1994.

Bolivia

Convenio entre el Gobierno de la Rep6blica del Perii y el Gobierno de la
Repiiblica de Bolivia sobre Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones,
30 de julio de 1993.

Colombia

Convenio entre la Repidblica de Colombia y el Gobierno de la Repdiblica del
Perfi sobre Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, 26 de abril de
1994.

El Salvador

Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la Repdiblica de El Salvador y el Gobierno de la
Repuiblica de Perd para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, 13
dejunio de 1996.

Paraguay

Convenio entre la Reptiblica del Perti y la Repdiblica del Paraguay sobre
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, 31 de enero de 1994.

Venezuela

Convenio entre el Gobiemo de la Reptiblica de Venezuela y el Gobierno de la
Repilblica del Perf sobre la Promoci6n y Protecci6n de Inversiones, 12 de enero
de 1996.

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO
Canada

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection
of Investments, 11 September 1995.

United States Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago Concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, 26 September 1994.
UNITED STATES
Argentina

Agreement between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, 14
November 1991.

Bolivia

Treaty between the United States of America and the Government of the
Republic of Bolivia Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection
of Investment, 17 April 1998.
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Ecuador

Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, 27
August 1993.

Grenada

Treaty between the United States of America and Grenada Concerning the
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, 2 May 1986.

Haiti

Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Haiti
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, 13
December 1983.

Honduras

Treaty between the United States of America and the Government of the
Republic of Honduras Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment, 1 July 1995.

Jamaica

Treaty between the United States of America and Jamaica Concerning the
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, 4 February 1994.

Nicaragua

Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Nicaragua Concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, 1 July 1995.

Panama

Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Panama
Concerning the Treatment and Protection of Investment, 27 October 1982.

Trinidad & Tobago
Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago Concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, 26 September 1994.
URUGUAY
Canada

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
Eastern Republic of Uruguay for the Promotion and Protection of Investments,
29 October 1997.

Chile

Acuerdo entre la Reptiblica de Chile y la Repfiblica Oriental del Uruguay para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de las Inversiones, 26 de octubre de 1995.

Panama

Convenio entre la Reptiblica de Panamdy la Repitblica Oriental del Uruguay
para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, 15 de septiembre de
1998.
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VENEZUELA
Argentina

Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la Repfiblica de Venezuela y el Gobierno de la
Repdiblica de Argentina para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciprocas de
Inversiones, 16 de noviembre de 1993.

Barbados

Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la Repfiblica de Venezuela y el Gobierno de
Barbados para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n de Inversiones, 15 de julio de 1994.

Brazil

Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la Reptiblica de Venezuela y el Gobierno de la
Repfiblica Federativa de Brasil para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de las
Inversiones, 4 de julio de 1995.

Canada

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
Republic of Venezuela for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 1 July
1996.

Chile

Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la Reptiblica de Venezuela y el Gobierno de la
Reptiblica de Chile sobre Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, 2
de abril de 1993.

Costa Rica

Acuerdo entre la Repiiblica de Venezuela y la Repfiblica de Costa Rica para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, 17 de marzo de 1997.

Ecuador

Convenio entre el Gobierno de la Repiblica de Venezuela y el Gobierno de la
Repfiblica del Ecuador para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciprocas de
Inversiones, 18 de noviembre de 1993.

Paraguay

Convenio sobre Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones entre el
Gobierno de la Reptiblica de Venezuela y el Gobierno de la Repdiblica del
Paraguay, 5 septiembre de 1996.

Peru

Convenio entre el Gobierno de la Repiiblica de Venezuela y el Gobierno de la
Repdiblica del Perti sobre la Promoci6n y Protecci6n de Inversiones, 12 de enero
de 1996.
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Other Relevant Arrangements

OAS

SELA

Antigua & Barbuda
Argentina
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Canada
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba (excluded from participation since 1962)
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Grenada
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
St. Lucia
St. Vincent & the Grenadines
Suriname
St. Kitts & Nevis
Trinidad & Tobago
United States of America
Uruguay
Venezuela

Argentina
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Colombia
Costa Rica
Chile
Cuba
Ecuador
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Grenada
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Suriname
Trinidad & Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela
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OECS

Antigua & Barbuda
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominica
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Grenada
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
St. Kitts & Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent & the Grenadines
Suriname
Trinidad & Tobago
Venezuela
Aruba
The Netherlands & Antilles
France

Antigua & Barbuda
Dominica
Grenada
Montserrat
St. Kitts & Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent & the Grenadines
Anguilla
British Virgin Islands

